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ON THE DEFINITION OF "RELIGION" 
Philip E. Devine 
This essay is concerned with the definition of religion. This definition is developed within 
a context which recognizes the impossibility of value-neutrality in the definition of words. 
The definition proposed is applied to three complex borderline cases: Spinozism, Marxism, 
and economism or free-market ideology. 
I 
It is now far too late to complain of persuasive definitions, 1 as if they constituted 
a species of intellectual sharp practice. A definition of "violence" that includes 
ad hominem arguments along with rape and arson, or a definition of "fanaticism" 
that includes Kantians as well as Nazis, can be censured for attempting to win 
cheap and therefore spurious intellectual victories. But no non-persuasive defini-
tion of an evaluatively charged expression is possible. 2 
In the first place, any definition of a term3 already in use, however lexical its 
intentions, will reject some actual uses as erroneous or stretched, while at the 
same time suggesting new uses. Where the term in question is evaluatively 
charged, such smoothing and generalization of actual patterns of use will have 
an evaluating dimension. To argue that some things people have called "terrorism" 
do not deserve the name, or that other things to which people have denied the 
name do deserve it, is to take a position with strong evaluative implications. To 
such a conclusion not only conceptual, but also normative, arguments are relevant. 
Second, even those relatively neutral definitions C. L. Stevenson calls "de-
tached'" designate some objects (or classes of objects) as worthy of attention; 
and, for that reason, imply a preference for one of many possible methods of 
inquiry. Nor is it possible to speak here only of mutually tolerant interests in 
knowledge. Projects of inquiry are parts of broader research programs, and these 
in tum are linked to wider social, political, and even religious or anti-religious 
movements. And what is true of "detached" definitions is true, a fortiori, of 
what Stevenson calls "reemphatic" definitions, i.e., those whose point is to call 
attention to analogies and distinctions. Such questions must not be regarded as 
merely verbal, to be settled by majority vote or other authority, so that the 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 3 No.3 July 1986 
All rights reserved. 
270 
ON THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION 271 
discussion of interesting substantive issues can proceed. For there have been 
times and places where it has been a matter of dispute, among otherwise reason-
able people, whether Jews were human beings. 
A value-free definition of "religion" is thus impossible. But the evaluations 
that shape definitions of religion are particularly complex. Sometimes "reli-
gion"-and even more so "theology"-is used in a hostile sense, in polemics 
against Marxism, for example. At other times "religion" is a good word, used 
to protect deviants, such as Jehovah's Witnesses or conscientious objectors, 
against penalties. More subtly, we often encounter the view that religion, while 
a good thing on the whole, is not to be taken altogether seriously. This view is 
to be found even among those who habitually take part in religious observances. 
Some Christian theologians have attempted to evade this attitude by distinguishing 
(true) Christian faith from (human) religiousness, including cultural deformations 
of Christianity. But the analogies between every known form of Christianity and 
Buddhism, for example, are too clear to be evaded by this strategy. 
Opportunities for special pleading abound here. Where, as in the United States, 
the law endeavors to protect religion from government as well as government 
from religion, the definition of "religion" is an especially sensitive issue. For 
shifting definitions of "religion" can be used to favor beliefs and institutions 
with which one is in sympathy, and to penalize those to which one is hostile. 5 
On no view is every form of religion desirable. And to characterize a belief 
or practice as religious makes an apt polemical point only when it calls attention 
to a failure of self-knowledge; otherwise a group can happily embrace a charac-
terization of its beliefs and practices as religious. Those who deal professionally 
with the aftermath of nuclear war, and the influence of the various possible 
aftermaths on contemporary international politics, are aptly, if polemically, called 
"nuclear theologians." The expression gets its point both from the unknown 
character of the subject of their inquiries and the resistance the human imagination 
displays when confronted with it. (The "god" the nuclear theologians study is 
of course Kali, with her necklace of skulls.) But for the rest, those who attempt 
to define "religion" should bear in mind the complexity of the evaluative back-
ground, and avoid simple-minded ideological gambits. 
II 
Two patterns of definition might be attempted. One looks for necessary and 
sufficient conditions-for sets of properties possessed by all and only religions. 
A second abandons the search for necessary and sufficient conditions, and looks 
instead for a set of religion-making characteristics, establishing a family 
resemblance among the various phenomena called "religion."6 Neither pattern 
of analysis is altogether satisfactory. 
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Anyone who can find a useful set of necessary and sufficient conditions 
distinguishing Homeric religion and the more austere forms of Buddhism from 
all non-religious forms of belief and action will have performed a remarkable 
feat. But merely to list religion-making characteristics is to leave the subject in 
as much chaos as one found it: unless we can say that the idea of salvation is 
more central to religion than the existence of sacred objects, little understanding 
of religion will be possible. 
I take the standard forms of Christianity as my paradigm of religion, rather 
than Judaism or the movement headed by the Reverend Sun Myung Moon. A 
consequence of this decision is to make it more difficult (which is not to say 
impossible) to see religion primarily as a matter of communal affiliation, inherited 
or voluntary, without essential transcendent reference. My justification for so 
doing is in part autobiographical, but it gains significant support from ordinary 
language as well. Someone who takes part in Jewish cultural life without believing 
in the God of Israel is what people call a nonreligious Jew. But the most important 
impulse behind my choice of paradigms is philosophical: a desire to have the 
resulting definition address the question, under what conditions the transcendent 
can be apprehended by human beings. 
Two central criteria for the existence of a religion can be distinguished. Where 
both of these criteria are present, as in the central forms of Christianity, we can 
confidently say that a religion is present. When only one is present, whether we 
call the phenomenon a religion will depend on criteria of a less central sort. 
When neither is present, the phenomenon will be labeled non-religious. 
The first criterion is doctrinal: a religion affirms the existence of one or more 
superhuman agents, on whose favor the welfare of human beings depends. I say 
"superhuman," not "supernatural," since not every culture distinguishes between 
nature and supernature, and some philosophers have argued that the distinction 
is obsolete even in the West. 
A consequence of this criterion is that some forms of belief in flying saucers 
are halfway at least toward being religious. Extraterrestrials who are indifferent 
to human beings are no more suitable as objects of religious devotion than are 
the indifferent gods of Epicurean philosophy. But if someone believes that his 
well-being depends on maintaining the good will of superior beings inhabiting 
another planet, he has moved at least a substantial way toward making his belief 
into a religion. 
The second criterion is psychosocial or functional. A religion by the second 
criterion unifies, through a system of symbolic representations, the framework 
by which an individual or group regulates its thought and its life, and thus 
manages to maintain in them some semblance of coherence. Many people will 
hold that the second criterion is appropriate for the higher religions, whereas the 
first picks out a class of superstitions. And others will hold that the first criterion 
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is necessary to the presence of a full-blooded religion, whereas the first alone 
picks out only watered-down modernistic "faiths." But-though the issues are 
not entirely separate-we are not here concerned with good vs. bad religion, 
but with characteristics common to good and bad religions alike. 
Religion is both an individual and a group phenomenon, comprising "faith" 
in an individual and "tradition" in a group. 7 An individual's faith is both stimulated 
and informed by the tradition he takes as normative, and one important expression 
of a faith is the transmission of its corresponding tradition (perhaps reformed) 
to others. Personal faiths that are sustained by, and help sustain, the Christian 
and Buddhist traditions have enough in common to be discussed together as 
examples of Christian and of Buddhist faith. This does not mean that Christians 
and Buddhists are primarily concerned with sustaining Christianity and Buddhism; 
on the contrary, the central concern of a devout Christian is God (or Christ), 
and that of a devout Buddhist Nirvana. 
Every individual and every group has a framework, an a priori: a set of 
presuppositions which make thought and life possible. It does not follow that 
every individual or group is religious, even by the second criterion. For a 
framework can lack unity of any sort, and be a mere inherited conglomerate. 
Or the adherents of a framework may attempt to give it a unity by means of 
clear and distinct ideas rather than by means of symbolic representations. They 
may believe, in the words of Wittgenstein (somewhat ironic in their context), 
that "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about 
we must pass over in silence."8 
By a representation is meant some form of nonliteral speech-say a paradox 
or a myth-whose point is to convey what cannot be expressed literally. A myth 
need not be historically false, but it dramatizes whatever historical truth it may 
contain in order to convey what its adherents believe is a nonhistorical truth. 
And for many myths the question of historicity does not arise, since they portray 
in narrative form what happens before or after history. A paradox, taken literally, 
is self-contradictory and thus false: it asserts, for example, that the same entity 
is at once unqualifiedly God and unqualifiedly human. But to take a paradox in 
this way is to miss its point, which is to direct the mind beyond what can be 
explained literally. 9 Other forms of nonliteral speech employed in religious dis-
course include parables (which, unlike myths, do not even look like history), 
metaphors, action-symbols; and, most austerely, statements in which words like 
"good" are projected by analogy to a subject other than those to which they 
ordinarily apply. That even analogy is a mode of non-literal speech entails that 
theology cannot be deductive discipline. 10 
Religious representations differ from those involved in popular science, for 
example, in that they are, or are believed to be, irreducible. Those who employ 
representations are not infallible about their character. They may be unaware of 
274 Faith and Philosophy 
the pictorial character of their speech. They may resist the recognition that their 
speech is pictorial; if so, we can call them "fundamentalists," without troubling 
ourselves whether those people called "fundamentalists" are fundamentalists by 
this definition. II They may believe that their representations are irreducible, 
whereas in fact they can be translated without remainder into non-religious terms. 
Finally, representations intended as merely rhetorical may escape from the control 
their underlying literal sense: parables designed to evade censorship may take 
on a life of their own and convey meanings far richer than that of a mere political 
statement. 12 
Religious representations differ from those involved in ordinary poetry in that 
they attempt to unify a framework by which an individual or group conducts its 
thought and life. Such unity is achieved in one or both of two ways. It can be 
achieved in the ways a work of music, art, or literature is unified, i.e., through 
narrative structure, recurrent themes or images, and other devices of the same 
sort. It can also be achieved by directing those who adhere to a religion toward 
a Supreme Good at which the beliefs and practices characteristic of the religion 
point. 
These two modes of unification are connected, insofar as the Supreme Good, 
towards which the beliefs and practices characteristic of a religion point, is that 
which cannot be expressed by ordinary prose, but requires the methods of indirect 
communication characteristic of religious discourse. And, insofar as one version 
of the Supreme Good is union or communion with a Supreme Being, on Whose 
favor the welfare of human beings depends, religion by the second criterion can 
be linked to religion by the first. 
We have now made contact with the tradition for which religion is a matter 
of a person's ultimate concern. but a definition in such terms fails to include 
the religion of Homeric Greece. Hence I employ reference to a Supreme Good 
as part of one criterion tending to establish that a religion is present, rather than 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a religion. Nonetheless, 
the notion of a Supreme Good has a more central role than its place in my 
definitional structure would seem to indicate. For it is the Supreme Good that 
links the two criteria in a religion like Christianity: it is the possibility of union 
or communion with God that provides a source of unity in the lives of believers, 
and to which the representations enacted in Christian practice point. 
Sometimes a group or an individual will adopt two religions-in traditional 
China, Confucianism and Taoism; in Japan, Buddhism and Shinto--each of 
which deals with aspects of life the other neglects. In such cases, it is worthwhile 
to explore the possibility that the two traditions may form a compound-say 
ConfucianismlTaoism~apable of being unified in the manner characteristic of 
religion, if only a suitable prophet or theologian arises. 
It is now time to consider the relationship between the two criteria just 
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expounded and less central criteria, such as the presence of a concept of salvation 
and the existence of sacred objects. Sacred objects are those that figure in the 
action-symbols a religion includes. Salvation is release from bondage that is the 
ordinary lot of human beings and participation in the better world religious 
representations portray, including participation in the Supreme Good that provides 
believers with their principle of unity. 
Other less central criteria include the existence of an organized community, 
of a canon of Scripture, of practices such as prayer, and of a characteristic 
strategy for dealing with those crises that threaten to disrupt the life of an 
individual or group: maturation, sexuality, childrearing, moral conflict (including 
guilt), suffering, and especially death. We also expect a religion to embody a 
protest against those aspects of the existing order that keep human beings in 
bondage. 
Prayer is a natural way of dealing with a superior being, on whose favor we 
depend. As for organized communities, canons of Scripture and the like, if a 
set of representations is to be maintained and transmitted to the next generation, 
it will be necessary to have some regular provision for doing so. (The very 
existence of religious representations, like any other form of language, requires 
community support, but not formal organization as such.) Appeal to a Supreme 
Good, and to that which gives a unity to the life of an individual or group, is 
particularly likely in time of personal or social crisis-when it becomes apparent 
that (in the words of the Book of Common Prayer) "we have no power of 
ourselves to help ourselves."'3 And one thing that is hoped for from superior 
beings is that they should rescue those undergoing crisis, or disfavored by the 
normal workings of the institutions of their society. But not every way of dealing 
with crisis or with oppression will count as religious. 
III 
So much, then, for the definition of religion in general. I now tum to three 
problem cases for the concept of religion: the philosophy of Spinoza, Marxism, 
and economism or free market ideology. 
A 
Stevenson maintains that Spinoza used the word "God" for his Substance 
because 
by giving the word ["God"] a new conceptual meaning Spinoza was 
enabled to direct its emotional force away from the old anthropomorphic 
meaning and center it upon substance, which he so earnestly thought 
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would be a more rewarding object of our wonder and humility .... 
But Spinoza "the atheist" was long in giving way to Spinoza "the 
God-intoxicated man," for the supporters of orthodoxy were not slow 
to see that his God was God in emotive meaning only. 14 
Another writer would say: Spinoza "the atheist" was slow in giving place to 
Spinoza "the God-intoxicated man," because supporters of orthodoxy needed to 
learn to stop using "atheist" as an all-purpose term of theological abuse, and 
recognize religious conceptions other than their own, even when in the last resort 
they continued to regard those conceptions as inadequate. 
The issue between such a writer and Stevenson is whether the continuities 
between Spinoza and St. Anselm are more or less important than the differences. 
Or again: whether the continuities between Spinoza and St. Anselm are more or 
less important that the continuities between Spinoza and later scientism and 
positivism. 
The philosophy of Spinoza turns out to be ambiguous on both criteria. Spinoza' s 
God-or-nature is a Being superior to human beings, on which they depend. And 
Hel5 is also a person, at least in the sense that, like finite persons, He is both 
thinking and extended (Ethics, Pt. II, props. 1 & 2). But to say that our well-being 
depends on the favor of Spinoza's God is to imply, or at least suggest, that He 
has it within His power to grant or withhold His favor. And Spinoza's God-or-
nature acts always out of necessity. 
As for the second criterion, whether Spinoza's framework requires represen-
tations to give it a unity depends on how seriously one takes his geometrical 
method. On its face, Spinoza's philosophy is a paradigm of the attempt to say 
everything clearly. But in fact Spinoza's arguments are far less rigorous than 
they appear: many of his most important doctrines occur outside the geometrical 
structure of the Ethics. 
The function of Spinoza's geometrical method is to a considerable extent 
rhetorical: it expresses what Spinoza's propositions assert, that everything hap-
pens with the same necessity that pertains to mathematical propositions. And 
Spinoza's Ethics is given unity, not so much by its relentless working out of the 
consequences of a few axioms, as by its presentation of the emanation of all 
things from God and the return of all things to Him; 16 and by its depiction of a 
way to blessedness, i.e., a way of returning to God by coming to know that one 
is part of Him already. 
Not only by the central criteria is Spinoza's philosophy ambiguous: it is also 
ambiguous by the subordinate ones. Spinoza's own attitude toward Christianity 
and Judaism is ambiguous: sometimes he regards the doctrines of these religions 
as socially useful lies, without which human beings would run amok (Pt. IV, 
prop. 54, schol.). But at other times he regards them as expressing, in pictorial 
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form, truths more adequately asserted in his own philosophy (Pt. IV, prop. 68, 
schol.) Such ambivalence is typical of adherents of new religions confronting 
those they regard as their predecessors. But the suggestion of a Machiavellian 
doctrine of the social utility of false religion sets Spinoza apart from Christians 
considering Judaism. 
A Spinozist Church would be hard to imagine. But disciples of Spinoza might 
come together to study his philosophy, as well as to consider its implications 
for life. A Spinozist could not consistently pray that his God should make things 
other than what they inevitably will be. But he might pray, in the manner 
suggested by D. Z. Phillips, in order to bring himself to accept the inevitable. 
In the absence of some practical (e.g., legal) purpose, requiring us to recognize 
or to refuse to recognize Spinozism as a religion, it is sufficient to notice the 
features that make it a borderline case. Having said this, I should observe that 
Spinoza's philosophy appeals to the religious side of my nature, as it has to that 
of many others. (That is not to say that I believe Spinoza' s philosophy to be true.) 
B 
The best discussion of the question, whether Marxism is a religion, that I 
know of lists a number of reasons for supposing it to be one before summarily 
concluding that it is not. 17 It might be clear, at least, that Marxism denies the 
existence of superhuman persons, "In sooth all gods I hate," writes Marx, quoting 
Aeschylus. ls But even here the evidence is ambiguous. Under capitalism, and 
at all times before the final liberation, human beings according to Marx are 
subjects of powers (such as the market) that are their superiors in power though 
not in wisdom: to hate them is not to deny their existence. More important, 
Marxists have tended to deify what they take to be beneficent forces: History, 
Revolution, the Dialectic, Stalin. Such deifications are not to be attributed to 
Marx himself,19 but they arise from gaps in his theory, and to that extent cannot 
be ignored by his expounders and defenders. The same may be said of the 
tendency to give to the writings of the Great Teachers the status of canonical 
scriptures. 
As for the second criterion, Marxism presents a dramatized version of world 
history, including an account of our past and present misery and our future glory, 
that in many ways resembles those presented by Christianity and Buddhism. 
One obstacle to seeing the resemblances between Marxism and these traditions 
is that older traditions promise salvation to individuals, where as a Marxist who 
does not live to see the promised end will have only the satisfaction of having 
died in the cause of the Revolution. But when one considers that Buddhism 
denies the reality of the self, so that in the strict sense no individual attains 
Nirvana, the contrast between Marxist and more conventional conceptions of 
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salvation will seem less acute. 
A more serious obstacle to regarding Marxism as a religion is the claim of 
Marxists that their doctrine is a science. One problem here is the existence of a 
wide sense of "science," for which any rational discipline, possibly including 
theology, is a science. 2o Marxists are claiming more than this, but there are 
distinct reasons why their claim to be scientific, in the way physics is thought 
to be, cannot be taken seriously. 
One has to do with the nature of the social sciences (including history), to 
which Marxism has made its most central contributions. Even in physics the 
religious and ideological beliefs of the scientist (Newton's Arianism, Einstein's 
Spinozism) influence the perceptions of relative simplicity crucial to the formu-
lation of theories. But it is not necessary to look to claims about the cosmos as 
a whole to feel the impact of conflicting visions of human life on the social 
science. In particular the influence of statements made by social scientists and 
historians on the behavior of human beings guarantees that no rigorous predictions 
will be possible, and that even the most objective-seeming social scientific 
discourse will have a heavy lacing of advocacy. And economics, which at one 
time at least formed the core of the Marxist intellectual program, suffers from 
a peculiar limitation: it works from a limited conception of human motivation, 
which human beings are always both rising above and falling below. 
The inherent limitations of the social sciences mean that ideology will always 
play a central role in their structure. And the role played by ideology could 
equally well be played by religion. And those who believe that Marxism is a 
religion will argue that, in this case, we have a religion supporting a research 
program in the social sciences as well as a mode of political rhetoric and political 
practice. 
But there are also reasons peculiar to Marxism why its scientific status could 
be questioned and its resemblance to what are conventionally regarded as religions 
emphasized. It is a central Marxist doctrine that not only the activity of human 
beings, but also their thought, is distorted under capitalism. Only under com-
munism will undistorted cognition be possible. Hence it something of a mystery 
how Marx could rise above his circumstances and discover the truth about human 
society. Thus Marxists are led to ascribe to their authors a mode of insight that 
transcends the merely human; and, in the same way, to personify the processes 
(or even to deify the agents) that are supposed to produce the transition to a 
better society. 
In a Marxist context actions, institutions, and moralities are to be evaluated 
by their tendency to bring about, or to retard, a state of affairs both distant in 
time and indefinite in nature. Even those Marxists who regard the Party as a 
body of experts who know the way to this state of affairs, and Marxist doctrine 
as the physics that corresponds to their engineering, quickly exhibit more than 
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merely scientific considerations. The heroic character of the assumption that 
anyone now alive knows the way to utopia-and the fact that no one now alive 
will live to experience it-makes it hard to see how belief in the Party's authority 
could long be sustained, apart from psychosocial mechanisms similar to those 
that sustain religious commitment. 
When we turn to secondary criteria, we are again confronted with an ambiguity. 
A Marxist will not pray (except, in extreme cases, to Stalin or Mao), though he 
may take part in rituals designed to reinforce solidarity with his political allies 
and commitment to his political ends. As far as the psychosocial dimension of 
Marxism is concerned, the analogies with Christianity write themselves: conver-
sion and apostasy, heresy and schism, anathemas, greater or less degrees of 
fervor in the faith-all of these have counterparts in a Marxist context. And 
three further analogies can be stressed, the search for a pure Marxism uncorrupted 
by Stalin, Lenin, Engels, or even the mature Marx; the dilemma of centrally 
imposed orthodoxy vs. a situation of chaos, in which Marxist rhetoric is used 
to advance virtually any political claim/' and the fact that those who no longer 
consider themselves Marxists (or who never considered themselves such) may 
still exhibit Marxist instinctive responses. 
Special mention should be given to a feature of the situation of contemporary 
men and women that contributes to the appeal of Marxism and other political 
ideologies. Human beings have always suffered, and been unable to understand 
the causes of their suffering. Birth, maturity, sexuality, the rearing of children, 
and death have always been sources of crisis in human life. But contemporary 
people suffer from a peculiar set of problems: efforts to control the circumstances 
in which human beings live, and to make their institutions responsive to their 
needs, have issued in practices that even highly educated people are unable to 
understand. 
Hence arises one source of political conflict, which cuts across the usual 
categories of Left and Right, between those who claim a right to the attention 
of others by reason of their ability to hold together many diverse sorts of data, 
and those who claim attention by reason of their capacity to simplify the data 
with the help of a few burning symbols. The most conspicuous sorts of political 
ideology (Marxism among them) get their influence through the second sort of 
claim. 
But the feature of the contemporary human situation that supports political 
ideologies is one of many aspects of the predicament that supports religious 
doctrines and practices. The identities of contemporary men and women, and 
their capacity to conduct their lives in a coherent fashion, are threatened not 
only by death, suffering, and guilt; but also by institutions which, though they 
regard them as the products of their own activity, they are unable to understand 
and control. The limits on human knowledge, power, and self-command thus 
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support modes of rhetoric that promise escape from the resulting predicament. 
A final feature of Marxism that renders it similar to Christianity is its exclusiv-
ity, the fact that a thoroughgoing Marxist cannot accept Christian or other trad-
itional religious belief. Exclusivity is not a universal feature of religions, but its 
presence supports the classification of a phenomenon as religious. When this 
aspect of Marxism is abandoned, the case against regarding Marxism as a religion 
is very strong. When taken at its maximum claim Marxism is a religion; but 
Marxists have the ability to retreat, under practical or theoretical pressure, from 
their maximum claim and support Marxism only as a mode of political rhetoric 
or a research program for the social sciences. And this capacity is a feature, not 
only of Marxism, but of political ideologies generally. 
c 
Of the rivals to Marxism among contemporary ideologies, I propose to consider 
here only "economism," or the belief that the market is the sole or at least the 
decisive criterion of value, including that of human beings and their activities. 22 
More fully, the adherent of economism23 believes that the market is not merely 
one of the many ways in which human beings obtain goods and services, but 
one whose outcomes have a specially legitimate status. In contrast, to persuade 
others that considerations of justice or the common good require that one receive 
some benefit is to be, presumptively at least, a parasite. Economism holds that 
market conceptions are so tightly bound up with the idea of rationality that 
dissatisfaction with, or even ambivalence about, the workings of a capitalist 
economy can be ascribed to defects of character. Any claim not honored by the 
market is presumed to be frivolous, dishonest, or irrationaJ.24 
Adherents of economism frequently personify the market: they speak of what 
the market is trying to tell us. And, when they do so, it is fair to regard them 
as treating the market as a superhuman person, on whose favor the welfare of 
human beings depends. Doubt as to whether economism is a religion must 
therefore rest on the second criterion-in particular on the claim that we have 
here a mere manner of speaking, though one which has an important effect in 
securing acquiescence in the operations of the market even when these adversely 
affect the important interests of individuals or groups. It is assumed that at least 
some people have good reasons for accepting a market system, reasons which 
can be stated without reference to such pictures, but that other people either lack 
such reasons or are unable to appreciate their force. 
And it does seem that economism is not a religion by the second criterion. 
Adherents of economism do not seem to unify their frameworks by means of a 
set of representations. And the good at which adherents of economism aim is 
nothing like union with God, but rather freedom to pursue the good as one 
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conceives it (in one version, to join with others to construct one's conception 
of Utopia). 25 And that a capitalist economy is best capable of accomplishing this 
result is thought to be demonstrable by reason alone. 
The most sophisticated argument for this claim maintains that a market economy 
is essential, not only to individual, but also to collective, liberty. It depends on 
a capitalist political economy as a way of dealing with the instability of democratic 
political institutions, in the absence of a shared, stable, conception of the good 
with whose help discussions about the allocation of benefits and burdens could 
be made.26 The fear that underlies this argument is that the distribution of goods 
will come to depend so much on shifting majorities that men and women will 
rebel against the resulting insecurity and tum to authoritarian rule to rescue them 
from institutional chaos. The question, what will be the effect of maintaining or 
changing the economic status quo upon the functioning of political democracy, 
is thus central to discussions among liberal democrats and democratic socialists. 
But the reply of the opponents of free market ideology to the political argument 
for capitalism should be clear. There is something paradoxical about the attempt 
to protect democratic institutions by removing from their scope those questions 
about which human beings most intensely care. And to deny or limit severely 
the capacity of men and women to invoke democratic processes to control 
economic structures is to open these processes to corruption by those having at 
their disposal concentrations of economic power. 
The purpose of these critical remarks is not to settle long-standing ideological 
disputes, but to call attention to the pictorial representations that underly 
economistic arguments, and cause some people to find the political argument 
for capitalism more plausible than that of its opponents and critics. These include 
the picture of property rights as somehow attached to individuals, so that they 
can survive the demise of all other institutions; the picture of a private domain 
into which one can retreat to escape the (often conflicting) demands of other 
people; the notion that the market is something other than the decisions of human 
beings as buyers and sellers, something that can make painful decisions without 
anyone having to take responsibility for them; and the picture of an invisible 
hand which will somehow guarantee that the economic, though not for some 
reason the political, institutions of capitalist society will work well. To these 
may be added a conception of freedom that treats the exclusive ownership of 
material goods as central, and the chance to join with others in the pursuit of 
shared goods as peripheral. 
All of these pictures are capable of forming part of a total myth governing 
every aspect of human life. They do not usually do so, however and the most 
plausible such myth-which works from Darwin's theory of human evolution 
to an evaluation of human institutions in terms of their ability to survive-is as 
characteristic of Marxism as it is of the defense of the free market. 
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Turning to subsidiary criteria, adherents of economism do not pray to the 
market, nor is there anything approaching an economistic church. And one 
feature of economism that sharply differentiates it from Christianity and Judaism, 
as well as from Marxism, is that, in societies in which the market has a large 
role to play in determining the allocation of benefits and burdens, its effect is 
to confirm men and women in the belief that present social advantages and 
disadvantages are deserved. To adapt a phrase of Galbraith's, its role is to comfort 
the comfortable as well as further to afflict the afflicted. Yet this feature of 
economism is shared by Hinduism in some of its aspects (the doctrine of karma). 
Economism is similar to religions like Christianity in that it subjects human 
beings to a power other than themselves. But the "god" of economism is something 
plainly less than his worshipers: their activity as buyers and sellers. Whereas 
Marxism proposes to liberate us from bondage to such powers, economism 
celebrates that very bondage. Yet, at a deeper level, Marxism and economism 
may be seen to be united in their adherence to the central Spinozistic doctrine, 
that freedom is submission to necessity. 
It has been said that all disputes are ultimately theological. In a sense this 
statement is true, since any dispute, unless somehow controlled, widens into a 
dispute about the nature of the universe. But human beings sometimes succeed 
in pursuing their ends and resolving their disputes without addressing their most 
fundamental disagreements. Hence science and political ideology can be distin-
guished from religion, by the fact that they stop short of presenting a total picture 
of the universe. 
But there is no such thing as secular humanism, at least in the sense that has 
emerged in recent political controversy. There are assorted attempts to advance 
good causes while avoiding disputed theological and anthropological issues. 
There is a group of avowed secular humanists, whose principal activity is to 
publish some rather pathetic manifestoes. And there is a variety of non-theistic 
worldviews, which have grown up both outside and within the churches. But 
none of these add up to a coherent secular humanist movement, which a reflective 
person could embrace as an alternative to Christianity. 
Supernature abhors a supervacuum. And if Christianity continues to lose its 
grip on the consciousness of the West, we may expect to see an increasing 
number of remarkable substitutes. 27 
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